INTRODUCTION
Robert Wright, Manager of the General Aviation and Commercial Division of the Federal Aviation Administration, identified a new way of looking at General Aviation flight safety based on the intended utilization ofthe aircraft (2002) . In his "White Paper" he predicted that the introduction of a new class of "Technically Advanced Aircraft" (TAA) would have a significant effect on general aviation safety. A recently completed study of TAA accidents and incidents (Fiduccia, 2003, pp. 19) appears to support this assessment. The study concluded that these TAA's, which generally include an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) capable moving map Global Positioning System (GPS), multifunction display, and an autopilot, provided an increased level of "available safety" while delivering less actual safety (Fiduccia 2003, pp.6 ). The TAA Safety Study concluded that "Realistic Scenario Based" training is one solution to filling the gap between available and actual safety. This conclusion was based on the work of an FAA Industry Training Standards (FITS) research team consisting of partners fiom industry, academia, and the federal government (FITS Program Plan, 2003) . This group, after an extensive review of the literature and actual observation of current training practices, concluded that meaningful practice of real world situations expressed as scenario based training would improve the pilots ability to cope with ambiguous situations, make more informed and timely decisions, and ultimately improve safety.
Statement of tbe vroblem
The TAA is not inherently dangerous yet its advanced equipment, especially the addition of an extremely accurate moving map navigation capability, can lure pilots into increasingly complex situations. Traditional task and maneuver-based training may not prepare the pilot to understand or adapt to these new situations (Davisson, 2003) . Additionally, the speed, comfort, and costs associated with this new generation of TAA's increase their usefulness as alternatives for commercially available air transportation without providing a comparable increase in the level of safety (Wright, 2002) . Thus, this study focuses on training. If the aircraft has improved, and the mission is more complex, the remaining variable is the training and experience of the pilot.
Scenario based training
In order to understand the training option available in the broader aviation industry, the author visited the United States Air Force training facilities at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia and Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi. Both of these facilities train pilots with relatively few flying hours, who are then qualified to fly modem glass cockpit very high performance jet aircraft. These pilots fly the aircraft in a variety of complex mission scenarios. In each case the Federal Aviation Administration endorses the quality of these graduates, while not regulating their specific training flow or training methods (CFR Part 6 1 :73). Both locations employed various methods of mission oriented flight training which gave the student meaningful practice in real world situations.
A visit by the author to Northwest Airlines revealed similar training methods employed in the Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) portion of the Boeing 757 training curriculum. In this case, more traditional training methods were utilized up until the final lesson, which is conducted as a realistic flight scenario, and is used to measure the applicant's suitability to operate the aircraft with passengers on board (SFAR No: 58 to part 121). During each observation, the primary training in pilot judgment and decision-making occurred during realistic flight scenarios.
While scenario based training is not a new concept, its application to General Aviation on a larger scale represents a significant change. Traditionally, General Aviation has relied upon a combination of behavioral and cognitive learning strategies that place a premium on student knowledge acquisition and repetitive behavior. This approach is very useful when training a student to accomplish specific maneuvers or to learn specific tasks, or sequences of tasks. The FAA Aviation Inshuctor handbook, AC 60-14, which serves as the guide to General Aviation flight instructors, is deeply grounded in this behavioral and cognitive approach (1999) .
However, the goal of the FITS research effort is to "enhance the General Aviation pilots' aeronautical decision making, risk management, and single pilot resource management skills" (FITS website). This involves the application of knowledge to a variety of ambiguous situations. Gagne, Briggs, and Wager theorize that this type of problem solving may be best taught by providing the student with a "larger and better organized knowledge base" (1992, pp. 72) . This would seem to indicate that the greater the experience and knowledge about the system, the greater the probability of success in problem solving. However, Gagne expresses some doubt that these "executive or metacognition strategies" can be taught, instead, theorizing that learners develop them 6om a "variety of task oriented strategies" (1992, pp. 74-75) .
Another opinion, and the one under consideration in this study is that a constructivist approach to learning may provide a better way to teach problem solving skills (Durn and Jonassen, 1992) . Constructivism revolves around the development of a mental model or schema constructed by exposure to a realistic and complex environment. The problem for pilots transitioning 6om older and simpler aircraft to the complexity of the TAA is the simultaneity of learning and un-learning that must go on to master the new skills required. The highly automated TAA cockpit changes almost every aspect of the pilot's relationship with the aircraft's controls and indicators. Thus, much of what was learned previous to exposure to the TAA is now of diminished value. At the same time the TAA requires new skills more closely associated with personal computers than with aircraft instrumentation. In fact, a relatively new term, "automation bias" is used to identify the "omission and commission errors resulting 6om the use of automated cues as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing" (Burdick et al., . Thus, a pilot transitioning to a TAA is simultaneously forced to learn new information while constantly evaluating the accuracy and utility of previously known and accepted facts.
Malcolm Knowles, an acknowledged expert on adult education, speaks of this as he draws parallels between adult education theory and constructivism (1 992). Constructivism appeals to the adult learner desire to control the learning process and evaluate it in light of previous experience (Knowles, 1992) . In sum, constructivists and adult educators should agree that problem solving will be best learned in a realistic environment, based on authentic tasks, and grounded in experiential learning. In the end, the student will learn a "way" to think about a given set of circumstances, instead of simply "what" to think about a set of specific problems. Building on the observations 6om the military and air carrier operations, the research indicates that a constructivist approach to learning, when integrated with the more traditional behavioral and cognitive strategies may prove very effective in developing higher order judgment and decision making skills. Background The air caniers discovered that these higher order judgment and decision-making skills were best understood within the M e w o r k of a concept called Cockpit Resource Management (CRM). CRM is generally defined as the utilization of all potential resources that are available to the crew in making decisions (Weiner, 1993) . In the commercial airline industry, these resources can include but are not limited to; pilots, flight attendants, dispatchers, mechanics, Air Traffic Control, and additional crewmembers. CRM emphasizes the ability to effectively communicate. How a person communicates, how information is exchanged, how one behaves, and how decisions are made, are all components of a CRM program. CRM, amongst other things, teaches pilots how to improve communication, prioritize tasks, delegate authority, and monitor automated equipment (Baron, 2003) .
Single Pilot Resource Mana~ement (SRM)
Since the TAA is more similar in design and operation to was wa Resourc and scie~ air carrier aircraft than the traditional General Aviation (prior and during flight) to ensure that the successful aircraft, the FITS research team felt a version of CRM outcome of the flight is never in doubt7' (Ayers, 2003) . It is tailored to the unique requirements of the single pilot TAA fh-ther subdivided into the distinct areas of task rranted. This construct is called Single Pilot management, automation management, situational e Management (SRM). SRM is defined as "The art awareness, risk management, and controlled flight into nce ofmanaging all the resources (both on-board the terrain (CFIT) awareness as depicted in table 1. R and from outside sources) available to a single pilot Table I Single Pilot Resource Management (SRM
The art and science of managing all the resources (both on-board the aircraft and from outside sources) available to a single-pilot (prior and during flight) to ensure that the successful outcome of
Scenario Based Recurrent Training
Taken as a whole, these concepts address the majority of the risk inherent in single pilot, single engine flight. Since these concepts are dependent on the existing flight situation, the choice of a scenario based learning approach seemed logical.
So logical that Mr. Robert Price, Director of Operations and Training for the Cirrus (the Cirrus was the first new technology aircrafi to earn the title of TAA) Owners and Pilots Association (COPA) approached the author about developing a scenario based SRM seminar for the existing Cirms Pilot Proficiency Program (CPPP). COPA agreed to allow the FITS research team to tonduct some basic research on both SBT and SRM simultaneous to the training. METHOD The FITS team developed four distinct ground and flight scenarios that encompassed elements of all five SRM disciplines. Each scenario consisted of a pre-flight, pretakeoff, enroute, and arrival segment(s) that combined normal operations and procedures with abnormal and eventually emergency procedures. The scenarios were constructed using realistic situations that mirrored those routinely encountered by pilots ofthe Cirms Aircraft. As the scenario unfolds, the participants were presented with inputs that either requires modification of the existing route and plan of action. While some inputs required little or no action, others required more immediate action. Each scenario required the pilot to change the flight plan and either divert or perform an emergency landing.
The seminars were designed for presentation by a knowledgeable facilitator, and were presented to groups of up to twenty participants. Each scenario consisted of a set of PowerPoint slides, supplemented by a script for the facilitator. Participants were provided with required flight planning documents during the presentations and were asked to respond as if they were in the actual aircraft. At each decision point, the facilitator presented the new information then asked for discussion from the group. The facilitator to increase the realism of the scenario added additional scripted, and occasionally improvised, inputs.
Partici~ants
A total of 54 pilots participated in a total of four seminars conducted at two separate CPPP sessions, the first in St Augustine Florida, and the second conducted in Las Vegas Nevada. The largest seminar numbered 17 and the smallest 10 participants. Participants varied in age fYom 25 to 65 years of age and fiom 150-hour private pilots to several thousand-hour airline captains. In order for the scenario based, constructivist approach to be effective, several ground rules were agreed to beforehand. The facilitator acted as the moderator to ensure the scenario remained on track and the appropriate learning objectives were achieved. First, the participants agreed in advance that nothing said in the room would be associated with an individual participant after the seminar ended. This was done to ensure free and open communication. Second, the participants agreed that there would be no personal criticism of participant inputs. Rather, the merits of the opinions presented would be discussed. Since judgment and decision-making is based on the individual's perception of the situation, individual knowledge and experience, and tolerance for risk, all participants were allowed to manage their own risk factors and learn the lessons they deemed important. The facilitator rebined from enforcing his will on the class at any time. This approach seemed to be effective as each seminar started out a little tentatively, but by the time the frrst scenario was completed, the discussion and debate were often vigorous.
The seminars were divided into a morning and afternoon session, each lasting three hours. The seminars followed two days of intensive task-based flight training and fact-based ground training administered by the CPPP staff. At both locations the last scenario in the seminar was custom built to represent the typical CPPP participants most likely flight home that evening. In St. Augustine a flight to Washington, D.C. was the last scenario, and in Las Vegas a flight to Los Angeles concluded the day. Interestingly, the weather in the St. Augustine return scenario was almost identical to the weather forecast for the east coast that evening, causing several participants to decide to remain over night until the situation improved. Thus, the SRM seminars formed a sort of capstone to the CPPP program.
Survev construction and administration
Two separate survey instruments were used to evaluate the SRM seminars. The first instrument (appendix 1) was developed just prior to the St. Augustine seminar and was administered to 27 participants during two separate seminars. It is based on Kirkpatrick's four levels of training evaluation and attempts to obtain a snapshot of the participant's opinions on the enjoyment, understanding, and eventual employment of the subject presented (Hohne, 2000) . Additionally, the survey asked participants to rate whom they learned the most from, the instructor, the group, or their own reflection on the material presented. Finally, each participant was asked to identifjl the best part of each seminar as well as the one item they would change if they could.
Based on the results of the first survey, the second survey instrument included similar questions, but posed several additional questions pertaining to the quality and realism inherent in the scenarios. The written portion of the survey changed as well, asking the participants to identi@ the three best parts of the seminar, and three areas for improvement. , During each of the seminars, the facilitator (the author facilitated all four seminars) observed the level of participation, student interest in particular scenarios, and ease of preparation and delivery. These observations are included in the results. At the end of each scenario the participants were asked if they would be willing to participate in a longitudinal study of their1 attitudes and performance. Every participant agreed to participate by leaving a name, phone number, or E-mail address. RESULTS The data shows that a clear majority of participants in both seminars found the training enjoyable, interesting and the subject matter useful. In the St. Augustine seminar, the three highest rated answers were: (1) "Do you understand the basic philosophy of SRM" (4.931 5.00); (2) " Did you feel the subject was worthy of discussion and enjoyable" (a tie at 4.89 15.00; and (3) "Will you consider using SRM" (4.8515.00).
At the Las Vegas seminar the three top answers were: (1) "is scenario discussion an effective teaching tool " (4.5615.00); (2) "will you implement SRM into your flying habits" (4.4815-00); and (3) a three way tie between "scenario realism", "the use of mental imagery to rehearse flight scenarios", and "the practice of SRM after the course"(4.4 115.00).
Several specific results stand out. A clear majority of participants in the Las Vegas seminar had experienced very little scenario-based training (this item was not measured at St Augustine) prior to attending the CPPP. This is significant since most participants had received significant amounts of aviation training. In St. Augustine, most felt they learned more fiom the group discussion than from their own reflection on the subject. This fact was born out by the author's personal observations of the lively and candid discussion that accompanied each seminar. In fact, on several occasions the discussion became spirited to the point of good-natured debate.
The greatest insights may be obtained by reading the written inputs of the participants. Over half of the participants wrote about the scenarios, enjoying them, wanting more of them, or wanting more realistic ones. In any case the majority of participants seemed to realize that they learned best during these opportunities to mentally rehearse and practice real life situations. Even the areas for improvement comments reflected the desire for fewer introductory events and more and better scenarios. Many wanted to see the scenarios taken to the next level through the use of desktop simulation. This combination of interest in the scenarios and an initial commitment to change seems to indicate the strength of the scenario based approach, as well as the content. DISCUSSION First, the participants and the course developers agree that realistic scenario development is both challenging and critical to the success of SBT. A comparison of the first and second seminar survey results appears to indicate significant progress was made in this area. Second, the facilitator needs to be comfortable guiding the discussion to a reasonable conclusion and tolerant of the different experience levels in the class. Several times, the class would diverge on a critical go-no-go decision based on their individual levels of experience and training. This actually turned out to be quite helpful. Those who had already decided to continue the flight were forced to consider the risks that others saw in that decision and those who chose to abort the flight saw how the more experienced pilots managed risk and made decisions, a positive result for both groups. Third, the more realistic the scenarios the better learning improves. The high point of the Las Vegas seminar (and of all the sessions) occurred as a loss of control scenario was presented to the Cirrus pilots at a low altitude (1500 feet). Spontaneously, Mr. Bob Price of COPA began to forcefblly call out the descending altitudes to the class in real-time, forcing a decision to use the Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System (CAPS) (the CAPS system is a new safety innovation that allows the entire aircraft to descend to the ground under a parachute canopy). The group reaction to this life or death situation was at once visceral and chaotic. The realization that very little time would elapse between the onset of spatial disorientation and ground impact was a lesson that could only be experienced (even if only verbally simulated) safely in the scenario discussion. One participant wrote later that the experience was 'sobering." CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Scenario Based Training and Single Pilot Resource Management appear to be at least initially effective in helping pilots understand how to respond to abnormal and emergency situations. The combination of the behaviorist, cognitivist, and finally the constructivist approaches to training encompassed in the three day CPPP seminars seemed to compliment each other and produce pilots capable of knowing "how" to think as well as "what7' to think. Possibly the strongest endorsement of this concept is the recent COPA decision to integrate the SRM scenarios as seminars is underway and will be the subject of a follow-up a permanent addition to the CPPP curriculum.
paper. Finally, additional research to more fully develop the While the initial results appear promising, much work concept of SRM should provide better insights into why and remains to be done. Additional research on the quality and how pilots can reduce risk and make more timely and quantity of scenario inputs will increase the effectiveness of informed decisions. No answer -8 people Multiple risk assessment applications 5 P's/Paul/ Risk management numerical value/ discussions on personal minimums. Why do pilots take a course like this (or a similar King Course) and listen, nod heads, and then think "it doesn't apply to me?" Nothing Faster pace on the initial slides/more time on sample scenarios Less predictable scenarios -2 people
More detail of what each "P" in the 5 P's can cover Less introduction (authors note, introduction was the only "lecture" portion) More time -2 people More scenarios -2 people A more standardized way of implementing SRM of advice on developing SRM system for the pilot. Add a pilot flying and a pilot not flying checklist Provide handouts of all presented materials -2 people Less interactive Use desktop computers to increase the scenario realism
